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ABSTRACT 
The goal of this project was to develop a piping modification to allow the Reactor 
Water Cleanup system at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station to function during a refueling 
outage. The process of shutting down the reactor before the refueling outage disturbs an 
oxide layer of radioactive contaminants that is settled on the primary piping of the reactor 
and releases it into the reactor coolant. The practice employed to remove the highly 
radioactive decontaminants before the refueling outage was a manual process that caused 
nuclear workers to obtain a higher occupational radiation dose.  The normal reactor 
coolant decontamination system is shut down during a refueling outage due to 
maintenance; therefore, it was requested that a piping modification be developed to allow 
the operation of this system, the Reactor Water Cleanup System, during a refueling 
outage.  The modification designed in this project connected the Reactor Water Cleanup 
System with the Fuel Pool Cooling system, allowing operation of the Reactor Water 
Cleanup system during a refueling outage and introducing a new mode of operation titled 
Alternate Injection Mode.  This could eliminate the need for the original manual cleaning 
process and was estimated to reduce occupational dose by 2,000mrem every refueling 
outage.     
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear power is a major emission-free electricity source in the United States and 
many other parts of the globe. Coal is the only fuel source that produces more electricity 
than nuclear power, but burning coal produces harmful greenhouse gases. Electricity 
from nuclear power units avoids the production of greenhouse gases (See Glossary). In 
2011 alone, the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] estimated that Pilgrim Nuclear 
Power Station avoided 4,000 tons of sulfur dioxide, 800 tons of nitrogen oxide, and two 
million tons of Carbon Dioxide (Entergy® , 2012).  Nuclear power is also very 
sustainable meaning fuel supplies are not in short supply, especially with the prospect of 
breeding fuel and while the waste is hazardous, it has a very small volume comparative to 
other power sources.  
Though producing electricity by means of a nuclear power plant is considered 
more environmentally friendly, there are a number of challenges involved with safely 
operating a nuclear power plant. It is no secret there is an occupational radiation dose 
involved with operating a nuclear power plant. It is of utmost importance to keep 
occupational radiation dose as low as reasonably achievable. 
To gain unescorted access to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, each member of the 
team had to undergo 33 nuclear safety certifications and attend a 4-hour nuclear radiation 
worker practicum.  As part of the training required for unescorted access to any nuclear 
power plant, nuclear workers learn in great detail about radiation and steps taken to 
reduce dose. The background reading also covers pertinent information regarding 
radiation.  
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The United States has 103 operational nuclear units (A. Andrews, 2011). 
According the US Census Bureau, Massachusetts has exactly 2,818, 940 homes, and 
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant provides electricity to approximately 680,000 homes (J. 
Lindsey, 2012). Therefore, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station provides electricity for 
approximately 24 percent of Massachusetts. 
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, the only nuclear power station in Massachusetts, 
began operating commercially in 1972 (Entergy®, 2012). In 2012, Pilgrim’s license was 
renewed for twenty years by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
[USNRC] (Entergy®, 2012).  Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station’s only reactor is a GE Mark 
I Type 3 boiling water reactor [BWR] (Entergy®, 2012). Additionally, the reactor has a 
685 megawatt electric output (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2011). 
During a refueling outage, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station faces a difficult task of 
optimizing cost, worker dosage, and safety concerns in a short amount of time.  The goal 
of an outage, in addition to refueling the core and correcting any mechanical and non-
mechanical issues, is to minimize the total outage time and reducing worker dose.  To 
start a refueling outage, the reactor needs to be shutdown.  The traditional method of 
shutting down at Pilgrim Station was slow and costly.  New procedures use a scramming 
process to minimize the time it takes to really begin the outage while also minimizing the 
total time in the outage.  Despite this improved way of shutting down a reactor, an 
unintended consequence is release of debris in the water and is further compounded by 
the shutdown of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system and its cleanup function 
during refueling outages. The RWCU is a non-safety related system that does not assist 
reactor shutdown but are vital in maintaining normal operation mode (M300, 2013). The 
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main functions of the RWCU are to purify reactor water during the running times and to 
remove small radioactive and non-radioactive particle debris from the reactor water. The 
inoperability of the RWCU during refueling outages is leading to a less optimal outage 
time, added complexity in purifying reactor coolant during outage, and increased 
radiation levels at the start of refueling outages. 
The goal of the project was to develop a design and cost estimate for a piping 
modification to the Reactor Water Clean Up system that would address the above 
mentioned operational challenges during refueling outages, improve operational 
flexibility, reduce outage time, and reduce radiation levels during fuel outages, and filter 
out more Co-60 from the reactor.  
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2. BACKGROUND 
In order to modify the design of the Reactor Water Clean Up system, the main 
functions of the system were evaluated. Technical documents were examined to establish 
the function of the RWCU in relation to the overall function of the reactor and nuclear 
plant. Both normal operation and refueling operation system function had to be 
understood in order to properly modify the operational flexibility of the RWCU. Pilgrim 
Nuclear Power Station’s reference and training text provided detailed information 
regarding even the smallest components of the RWCU. The background section covers 
the function of BWRs, the function of the RWCU with respect the reactor, the primary 
functions and components of the RWCU at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, the function 
of a BWR during a refueling outage, and sources radiation during a refueling outage. In 
addition, a previously proposed modification to the RWCU to allow function during 
refueling is presented.  
2.1 Design of a Boiling Water Reactor 
As previously mentioned, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station only has one reactor. 
The sole reactor at Pilgrim is a General Electric [GE] Mark I Type three BWR (Andrews, 
2011).  GE created the BWR design in the mid-1950s. In fact, the design is employed by 
thirty-five BWR’s across the country (Andrews, 2011). Mark-I refers to the containment 
system of the reactor. Because Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station’s reactor began operating 
in 1972, it has the oldest containment system.  
In order to understand the necessity of the RWCU system, the function of the 
BWR must be explained. The function of a BWR is surprisingly simple and can be 
explained in five steps. First, water acting as reactor coolant absorbs the heat created by 
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the fission of enriched uranium in the core of the reactor (USRNC, 2012). The heat from 
the reactor converts water into a mixture of vapor and liquid. The steam is separated from 
recirculation water, dried in the dryer located at the top of the vessel, and directed into the 
steam line connected to the turbine (GE, 1980).  The steam is only used once before 
being condensed and returning to the reactor core to be reboiled. Finally, the turbine 
powers the generator producing electricity (USNRC, 2012).  The diagram below in 
Figure 1: Schematic of a Boiling Water Reactor. (USNRC, 2005) is a visual 
representation of the BWR process.  
 
Figure 1: Schematic of a Boiling Water Reactor. (USNRC, 2005) 
The heat generated in the reactor core is generated by a nuclear fission reaction 
(See Glossary). The element generally used in the nuclear fuel for the fission process is 
Uranium. Uranium exists in three different isotopes 234, 235 and 238 (Glasstone, S., & 
Sesonske, A. 1994). However, only Uranium-235 can be used directly for the release of 
13  
fission energy (Glasstone, S., & Sesonske, A. 1994). After absorption of a neutron the 
nucleus divides in a process called fission. Fission releases enormous amounts of energy 
mainly in the form of kinetic energy (See Glossary) of the fission products. 
In a BWR, as previously mentioned, water acts as the reactor coolant. The water 
flowing through the reactor must be kept extremely pure. The water primarily contracts 
impurities from the reactor core. Neutrons released in the fission process can activate the 
impurities via neutron capture and result in radioactivity within the coolant. The RWCU 
system removes impurities the reactor coolant and prevents fuel damage in the reactor 
core by reducing the potential for those impurities to corrode the fuel. It is very important 
to minimize corrosion, the possibility of fuel damage, and release of fission products in 
the coolant. 
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Figure 2: BWR Detailed Diagram (GE, 1980) 
 
2.2 Design of the Reactor Water Cleanup System  
The specifications of the RWCU system differ between nuclear power plants, but 
the main function is of the system is to maintain purity of reactor coolant. The RWCU is 
sized to process the entire volume of reactor system in approximately 4 hours (GE, 1980). 
According to the RWCU reference text at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, the RWCU has 
the following design functions: 
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• Continuous removal of radioactive waterborne materials generated in the 
coolant from fission and corrosion processes. 
• Continuous removal of soluble inorganic impurities (e.g., chlorides) that 
enter with the reactor feedwater and could, if not controlled, subsequently 
concentrate to exceed the specified water quality limits (see PNPS 7.8.1 
Water Quality Limits) 
• Maintain water quality requirements for water removed during startup and 
shutdown. 
• Limit heat and fluid losses from reactor system. 
(Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b).  
The RWCU system draws water from the reactor recirculation flow through the 
suction side of the reactors recirculation pumps. The inlet is a six-inch MO-1201-85 
valve and is named the Clean Up suction valve (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). The suction 
side is on the left side of Figure 2: BWR Detailed Diagram, and it draws from the blue 
lines near the bottom of Figure 1: Schematic of a Boiling Water Reactor. (USNRC, 
2005). The recirculation pumps in the reactor, shown in Figure 2: BWR Detailed 
Diagram, are different from the recirculation pumps in the RWCU. The reactors 
recirculation pumps control power in the reactor. The function of the RWCU 
recirculation pumps will be elaborated on later in this section. 
After going through the inlet valve, the flow goes through an inboard isolation 
valve (See Glossary). The inboard isolation valve, labeled MO-5 in Figure 4, isolates the 
flow from the recirculation loop and the reactor drain line (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). 
The inboard isolation valve is a main valve separating the flow from primary 
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containment. Next, the outboard isolation valve follows the inboard isolation valve. 
Similarly, the outboard isolation valve isolates the flow from primary containment. 
After going through the outboard isolation valve, the flow enters regenerative heat 
exchangers [HX]. The flow enters the regenerative heat exchangers first because the 
temperature of the flow must be lowered before the demineralizers. The flow enters the 
first regenerative heat exchanger at approximately 515°F and exits the last at 190°F 
(Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). The regenerative heat exchangers are located at elevation 51’ 
in the RWCU HX Room (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). The regenerative heat exchangers 
act as the first phase of cooling. When the regenerative heat exchangers lower the 
temperature of the flow by removing heat, a portion of that heat is recovered (Pilgrim 
Personnel, 2012b). The heat recovered by the regenerative heat exchangers is important 
because it reduces overall heat loss of the system. Temperature and pressure elements are 
located upstream and downstream of the regenerative heat exchangers. These elements 
ensure the regenerative heat exchangers are lowering the temperature of the untreated 
flow and are functioning properly. 
After flowing through the regenerative heat exchangers, the flow goes through 
non-regenerative heat exchangers. Non-regenerative heat exchangers do not recover the 
heat removed from the flow and simply reduce the temperature of the flow. The non-
regenerative heat exchangers are also located at elevation 51’ in the RWCU HX room 
(Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). The flow enters the regenerative heat exchangers at 
approximately 190°F and exits at 115°F (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). The non-
regenerative heat exchangers still ensure the flow exits at a temperature less than 130°F 
(Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b) in the event that regenerative heat exchangers are not fully 
17  
functioning. After passing through the non-regenerative heat exchangers, the flow goes 
into the RWCU recirculation pumps. 
The RWCU recirculation pumps are sized for a flow of 200 gpm (Pilgrim 
Personnel, 2012b). The RWCU recirculation pumps force the flow to the demineralizers 
for purification but will isolate the flow under any of the following conditions: 
•  Inboard isolation valve (MO-2) not full open 
•  Outboard isolation valve (MO-5) not full open 
•  Return isolation valve (MO-80) full closed 
•  RBCCW from pump high temp (140°F, TIS-1291-48A/B) 
  (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). 
Filter demineralizer units remove the corrosive agents from the untreated cooling 
water. The ion exchange resins can only remove contaminants if the flow is under 140°F 
(Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). The filter demineralizer units, shown in Figure 3, consist of 
many elements.  
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Figure 3: Cleanup Filter Demineralizer 
The most vital components of the filter demineralizer system are as follows: 
a. Cleanup Filter Demineralizers- These are used in the RWCU at Pilgrim Nuclear 
Power Station as pressure precoat filters. Pressure precoat filters have a 
removable flanged top section and a dished head pressure vessel (Pilgrim 
Personnel, 2012b). Tubes support the vessel flange. The tubes are fed through a 
steel screen supported by a tube sheet (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). These tubes 
collect the precoat material and powdered resin. The resins and precoat material 
are entirely responsible for removing contaminants from the flow. The flow enters 
the cleanup filter demineralizers through an inlet at the bottom of the vessel. 
During purification, the contaminated water flows radially through the tubes and 
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tube sheets mentioned previously (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). The filter 
demineralizers are designed for a flow of approximately 111 gpm. 
b. Holding Pumps- the pumps maintain the minimum flow required for the 
demineralizers to function properly. The resins and precoat material, responsible 
for removing contaminants, are held in place by the normal flow (Pilgrim 
Personnel, 2012b). If the flow drops below 75 gpm, the holding pumps will 
engage to increase the flow. 
c. Precoat Resin Tanks- these tanks consist of agitators that prepare a slurry of both 
precoat material and resin (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). The material is dispensed 
by the following system. 
d. Precoat Pumps-  these pumps distribute the slurry created in the precoat resin 
tanks. 
e. Cleanup Backwash Receiving Tank- this tank receives no longer active resin from 
the demineralizer. The single tank collects the spent media during demineralizer 
backwash and drains to designated storage tanks in the Radwaste Department. 
f. Screen Strainer- this unit prevents any resin from entering the reactor via purified 
reactor coolant. This situation could occur if any of the resin containing elements 
mentioned earlier were to fail. Resin entering the reactor could be indicated by a 
pressure difference, so a pressure differential switch rated at 5psid is located in 
the system (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). 
g. Flow Control Valves- these valves are located after each filter demineralizer unit 
(Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). The valves manually control the flow and can 
manually isolate the flow from the demineralizers. A pressure differential higher 
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than 10psid will cause the flow control valves to isolate the flow leaving the 
demineralizer. 
After the reactor coolant has been treated by the filter demineralizers, it passes 
through the return isolation valve labeled MO-80 in Figure 3. The return isolation valve 
controls the flow of treated water back to the regenerative heat exchangers (Pilgrim 
Personnel, 2012b). The regenerative heat exchangers receive the purified flow at 
approximate 115°F and exits at 460°F (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). The regenerative heat 
exchangers return the purified flow back to the reactor via a feedwater line (Pilgrim 
Personnel, 2012b). A visual representation of the RWCU system is displayed below in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: RWCU System Schematic 
21  
 The RWCU system is a crucial part to the proper function of the all operational 
modes of the system; however, due to the need to maintenance the return path at the 
feedwater line, it is not operational during a refueling outage. 
2.3 Refueling Outages 
 The Nuclear Energy Institute [NEI] states that “U.S. nuclear reactors shut down 
once every 18 to 24 months to refuel approximately one-third of the reactor” (NEI, 2013).  
The refueling outage process usually lasts about one month and is time sensitive because 
the plant is not generating electricity when the reactor is shut down.  A refueling outage 
is a multi-step process that requires complete understanding of all systems and their 
functions during the outage.   
System and RWCU operations during a refueling outage are important to 
understand when considering the need for the proposed RWCU modification. The design 
of the modification depends heavily upon which systems would be operational during a 
refueling outage. 
2.3.1 Reactor Shutdown Procedure  
Shutting down the reactor begins with a process called scramming.  The process 
of scramming a Boiling Water Reactor is used to manually or automatically shut down a 
reactor.  SCRAM stands for Safety Control Rod Axe Man and is the quickest way to kill 
any chain reaction in a reactor or to shut down a reactor rapidly.  The name comes from 
the early prototypes when the control rods were lifted by ropes and pulleys.  The lone job 
of the axe man was to cut the ropes in an emergency to shut down the reactor.  It is 
generally a very simple process and can successfully shutdown a reactor, and in 
22  
emergency conditions, protect workers, and the public. The process of scramming a 
reactor involves the complete insertion of control and safety rods into the reactor vessel 
to poison the reaction and shut it down promptly. 
At Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, scramming is used as a routine part of shut 
down.  Once the reactor has reached about 20% power, the control rods are inserted 
rapidly during the scramming process.  This rapid insertion causes a ‘kick up’ of small 
particles that are hiding in pipes, joints, and valves.  Once this happens, the water then 
becomes too murky to see through and the refueling process cannot be completed without 
this water being cleaned. 
After shutdown, cooling or cool down is the gradual decrease in temperature and 
removal of decay heat and is referred to as reactor cool down (Moore, 1987). It is 
accomplished through operation of the residual heat removal system (RHR). Cool down 
is then followed by cold shutdown. During cold shutdown, the reactor coolant is at 
atmospheric pressure and below two hundred degrees Fahrenheit. 
2.3.2 Water Clarity During Refueling Outage 
Ideally, the RWCU system would be used to clean the water following the 
scramming process. The RWCU system at Pilgrim is not functional during outages 
because the primary return for the water in the Feed Water system is shut down and 
isolated for maintenance. This prevents the RWCU from performing its primary function 
of purifying the water. Portable filters and demineralizers are used for a brief period of 
time to purify the water, reduce radiation levels associated with the radioactive debris in 
the water, so work can officially start on refueling.    
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There are only two systems available to purify reactor coolant during a refueling 
outage. These modes are also not designed to purify the reactor water during a refueling 
outage. The augmented fuel pool cooling [AFPC] modes are designed to extend the range 
of heat removal within the system.  The AFCP system can operate under two different 
modes.  The first mode is only available during operation of RHR shutdown cooling 
when the reactor basin (See Glossary) is flooded and the fuel pool gate is open.  The 
second mode is only available when the RHR shutdown cooling loop is not operating 
when the reactor basin is flooded and the fuel pool gate is open, or when the fuel pool has 
a high heat load and is isolated from the reactor basin.         
To compensate for the unavailability of the RWCU the augmented fuel pool 
cooling with purification [AFPC & P] mode was established to allow operation of the 
fuel pool cooling [FPC] system filter and demineralizer with the residual heat removal 
pump and heat exchanger.  The connection between the RHR and FPC systems is limited 
however, due to the difference in operating conditions of the two systems; therefore, the 
operating procedures contain instructions for appropriate system startup and operating 
procedures.  The efficiency of the AFPC & P mode is also restricted by the units within 
both systems.  The FPC system consists of one demineralizer that is designed to process 
670 gal/min of water during normal operation.  A schematic of the FPC system layout 
can be found below in Figure 5.  The FPC demineralizer is highlighted in orange while 
both FPC heat exchangers are highlighted in blue. 
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Figure 5: Fuel Pool Cooling System 
 Operation of the AFPC & P system during a refueling outage does not provide the 
complete water purification capacity that is desired.  Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is 
currently using portable demineralizers to augment the capacity of the combined 
RHR/AFPC system.  The filters are lowered into the flooded reactor vessel to purify the 
water before any refueling and maintenance can be performed.  This requires extra man 
hours and radiation exposure that could otherwise be avoided.  Thus the goal of the 
RWCU piping system modification is to allow operation during a refueling outage.  With 
the AFCP & P and the RWCU in operation simultaneously during a refueling outage, the 
required water purity can be achieved.  
25  
2.3.3 Administrative Dose Limitations and Goals 
Some basic information about the administrative dose limits set by Entergy® are 
available through the training modules on the NANTeL training site.  Entergy® has set a 
variety of limits based on the portion of the body that is exposed and in cases of a 
declared pregnancy.  The whole body, which includes the head, trunk, active blood-
forming organs and gonads, is limited to two rem per year.  This is generally the most 
restricting portion for dose limit. A declared pregnant worker has a limit of 0.4 rem for 
the full term of the pregnancy or 50 mrem per month (NANTeL, 2010).   The maximum 
amount of dose that can be received annually is 40 rem; however, this value only applies 
to the internal organs, extremities and skin. Due to the severe negative effects of radiation 
exposure to a fetus, it is highly encouraged that all female radiation workers that become 
pregnant declare their pregnancy to the company and fill out the appropriate paperwork.  
Any female radiation worker who decides to refrain from declaring her pregnancy is 
treated as any other radiation worker and assigned the normal administrative dose limits.  
Entergy® in congruence with the Radiation Protection department also sets yearly 
man-rem goals for refueling outage years and non-refueling outage years.  Man-rem 
refers to the total dose accumulated by a large number of workers. For non-refueling 
outage years, the man-rem occupation radiation dose goal is <25 rem (Pilgrim Personnel, 
personal communication, January 9, 2013). For refueling outage years, the man-rem 
occupation radiation dose goal is <37 rem (Pilgrim Personnel, personal communication, 
March 13, 2013).  These limits are set to ensure the safety of all the employees at 
Entergy® and are strict guidelines that provide insight into the goals and limitations of 
the project.   
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2.4 Water Clarity and Radiation 
 As previously mentioned the water clarity is of great concern during a refueling 
outage in terms of time and dose exposure.  During the scramming process a large 
quantity of Cobalt-60 is released due to the mechanical disturbance within the system. In 
fact, at the beginning of a refueling outage the dose associated with cobalt-60 when the 
reactor basin is flooded is 12mrem/hr (Pilgrim Personnel, personal communication, 
March 25, 2013). This form of cobalt later becomes the most significant source of dose 
concern and is one of driving forces behind this project.  The following paragraphs 
discuss in detail the creation and risk associated with cobalt in the reactor coolant.     
 The presence of Co-60 in the reactor coolant creates the greatest radiation 
exposure during a fuel outage and in order to remove more Cobalt-60, it is vital to 
understand the source of the Cobalt-60.  Stellite is a hard and corrosion-resistant metal 
alloy composed mostly of Cobalt (Gooch, 2007).  Stellite has a general composition of 
about 57% Cobalt (Co), 18% Chromium (Cr), 15% Tungsten (W) and 10% Nickel (Ni).  
It is used as a coating to extend the life of valve seats and ensure complete closure of 
valves.  It is designed to protect valves from the harsh conditions including temperature 
and pressure.  The RWCU system, as well as the majority of the systems at Pilgrim 
contains many of these valves throughout the system.  The stellite coating is composed 
mostly of Cobalt, Chromium and Tungsten (Gooch, 2007).  The coating contains Cobalt 
which is entirely in the form of the stable Cobalt-59 (Co-59) isotope. As the stellite 
comes into contact with the reactor water it corrodes and releases Co-59 into the reactor 
coolant water. After a cobalt atom gets leaches off of the cobalt chromium alloy stellite 
coating and into the reactor coolant water, it is bombarded with neutrons in the reactor 
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core.  Because cobalt will accept neutrons into its nucleus, the cobalt-59 (Co-59 or 59Co) 
atom becomes radioactive cobalt-60 (Co-60 or 60Co) isotope: 
𝐶𝑜 + 𝑛 → 𝐶𝑜2760012759  
 
 
With the addition of Co-60 to the coolant, the dose of radiation that is 
encountered when working near reactor coolant water, especially when the reactor head 
is open during refueling outage is increased significantly (T. Setzer, Personal 
Communication, October 25, 2012).  
The reason Co-60 is a radiation exposure issue during refueling outages is 
because of its long half-life and its decay mode.  Co-60 has a half-life of 5.2714 years, 
and it decays via beta-particle decay, β-.  When an element goes through beta decay, the 
products are one daughter atom (Ni-60), a Beta particle, an antineutrino, and two gamma 
rays. The gamma ray energies are 1.17 and 1.33 MeV and pose the exposure risk since 
they are most penetrating.  
2.5 Related RWCU Modifications 
Before researching potential locations for the piping modification, other 
modifications involving the RWCU were researched. The most recent and related 
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modification design was a project proposed in 2000. A member of the Mechanical 
Structural Civil Engineering Department [MSCD], proposed a piping modification that 
would have improved the operational flexibility of the RWCU.  
 Our project and the project proposed in 2000 by the Pilgrim personnel involved a 
potential intertie between the RWCU and FPC, but the purpose behind each modification 
was very different. As stated in the Introduction, the goal of this project was to modify 
the RWCU, so that it can purify reactor water during a refueling outage. The goal of the 
project proposed in 2000 was to modify the RWCU, so that it would be able to support 
the RHR system and increase outage decay heat removal (Pilgrim Personnel, 2000a). 
Despite the differences between the project statements, the Pilgrim personnel’s 
comprehensive research, detailed scope, justification approval, and technical review 
provided detailed information pertinent to this project.  In the technical review of the 
proposal, the Pilgrim personnel explained the limited availability of the RWCU during a 
refueling outage. As previously mentioned, the RWCU is primarily unavailable during a 
refueling outage because feedwater line A, responsible for returning the purified flow to 
the reactor, is isolated for maintenance. Disregarding the isolated feedwater line, if the 
RWCU were operational during a refueling outage it could increase thermal efficiency by 
maximizing decay heat removal. 
 During normal operation, the configuration of both the regenerative and non-
regenerative heat exchangers optimizes thermal efficiency (Pilgrim Personnel, 2000a). 
Besides normal operation, the configuration of the RWCU Heat Exchanger System could 
also optimize thermal efficiency during cooling, cold shutdown, and reactor vessel class 
one pressure test. Lastly, reactor vessel class one pressure test is a test performed near the 
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end of a refueling outage. During these procedures, the RWCU could provide 
approximately three times more heat removal at a rate of 12MBtu/Hr at 210°F (Pilgrim 
Personnel, 2000a).  
 In order to operate the RWCU as a backup to RHR, Pilgrim Personnel proposed a 
piping modification that would begin after the filter demineralizers in the RWCU and end 
at the discharge header of the FPC. As stated previously, during the normal operation the 
flow leaving the demineralizers is heated before being returned to the feedwater line. 
Because of the need to maximize heat removal of reactor coolant system during cool 
down, cold shutdown, and reactor vessel class one pressure test, the piping modification 
must bypass the regenerative heat exchangers. Running through the regenerative heat 
exchangers would reduce heat removal capacity. First, the lack of a bypass around the 
regenerative heat exchangers would limit the net heat removal to 4MBtu/Hr at 210°F 
(Pilgrim Personnel, 2000d). Secondly, the use of the regenerative heat exchangers could 
inhibit the ability to maintain a constant reactor coolant temperature during reactor vessel 
class one pressure test. Bypassing the regenerative heat exchangers would also alleviate 
the temperature and pressure differential maximizing the net heat removal by the RWCU 
back up the RHR. 
 The Pilgrim personnel’s piping modification would have involved the addition of 
a 4” intertie line. The 4”inch line would be manually operated metal seated ball valves, 
butterfly valves, and a spectacle blind flange (See Glossary) arrangement (Pilgrim 
Personnel, 2000d). Approximately 60ft in the length, the modification would require 
supports and a core bore (Pilgrim Personnel, 2000d). The core bore pass through a wall 
on the 74’ elevation floor. The 4” intertie would divert flow to the reactor basin, so the 
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cleanup portion of the RWCU could also be used during a refueling outage (Pilgrim 
Personnel, 2000a). 
 The second part of the Pilgrim personnel’s modification would have connected 
the 4” intertie line upstream of the inboard isolation valve. The 2” line would bypass the 
regenerative heat exchangers and return the flow to the feedwater line. The 2” line would 
allow maximum decay heat removal during a reactor vessel class one pressure test 
(Pilgrim Personnel, 2000a). Both portions of the Pilgrim personnel’s piping modification 
were designed according to the ASME/ ANSI B31.1 piping modification, material 
fabrication and inspection specifications (Pilgrim Personnel, 2000b). Although the 
second portion of the Pilgrim personnel’s modification would benefit the reactor vessel 
pressure test, it was not considered effective because it is not directly pertinent to the 
project.  
 The modification proposed in 2000 would have been constructed in two phases. 
Because locations for the intertie pipes are in high radiation areas, the areas would have 
needed to be chemically decontaminated in accordance with the As Low As Reasonably 
Achievable [ALARA] radiation plan.  In the ALARA review of his modification, the 
Pilgrim personnel suggested the use of decontamination valves despite the potential 
modification being located on the clean side of the RWCU filter demineralizer. Adding 
decontamination valves would potentially allow short decontaminations to be performed 
on the modifications during short RWCU outages (Pilgrim Personnel, 2000). Even more, 
The Pilgrim personnel’s potential modification would only be used during refueling 
outages, so it would not necessarily become contaminated during normal operation. The 
ALARA review also contained a suggestion to lower installation dose. The Pilgrim 
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personnel suggested a portable shield cart system be installed by Radiation Protection 
[RP] personnel.  
 With respect to the adequacy of the Pilgrim personnel’s design, the specifications 
for the piping were based on ISI Safety Class one, two, or three, Q/Non-Q Safety, and 
PNPS Class I or II Designations.  
 
Figure 6: Safety Class One and ISI Safety Class One portion of the RWCU 
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Figure 7: Safety Class One and ISI Safety Class One portion of the RWCU 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the PNPS Class One and ISI Safety Class areas of the 
RWCU. Class one areas were not the most desirable places for a modification because 
the Safety Specifications are the most rigorous and limited the feasibility of most 
modifications. Also regarding safety, both phases of the Pilgrim personnel’s design were 
evaluated according to the High Energy Line Break [HELB] Analysis. High Energy Line 
Breaks include any system or portion of system that could exceed the designated 
maximum temperature and pressure threshold during normal operation (Berkovsky et al, 
2007). The cost, safety related issues, location etc. involved with the HELB shown in 
Figure 7 prevented the Pilgrim personnel’s potential modification from being installed. 
If phase one and two of the Pilgrim personnel’s modification had been installed, 
their modes of operation would have been referred to as Refueling Bypass and Shutdown 
Bypass, respectively. During the operation of Refueling Bypass mode, the following 
conditions could have been expected. 
 
33  
Table 1. Conditions expected during Refueling Bypass mode 
Flow Rate Temperature Pressure Reject Flow Rate 
222 GPM 125 °F 49 PSIA 0 GPM 
 
Refueling Bypass mode would have involved the operation 4” intertie between the 
RWCU and FPC. The intertie would have aided the RHR by removing decay heat and 
would have purified reactor water. 
During the operation of Shutdown Bypass mode, the following conditions could have 
been expected. 
Table 2. Conditions expected during Shutdown Bypass mode 
Flow Rate Temperature Pressure Reject Flow Rate 
150-222 GPM 210 °F 1050 PSIA 0 GPM 
 
Shutdown bypass mode would have removed decay heat and maintain pressure during 
reactor vessel pressure head. Though the Pilgrim personnel’s modification was not 
implemented due to the HELB, his detailed design documentation and process contained 
vital information for this project.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Overview 
 The project was split into two different phases, the preliminary design phase and 
the detailed design phase.  The preliminary design phase included identifying candidates 
for inlets and outlets of the modification from the RWCU to the reactor vessel.  This 
phase included gathering and organizing basic information on critical design attributes 
and their requirements. The detailed design phase included development of detailed 
drawings, bill of materials, cost estimates, and dose savings estimates. The progression of 
the project, all necessary information necessary for the completion of the project, and the 
final project design were presented to Entergy®.  Within these phases there was a review 
process completed between the PNPS engineers and the WPI team as part of the 
fulfillment of the requirements for a project proposal with Entergy®.  The review process 
consisted of three meetings: 10%, 50%, and 90% scope meetings.  The output of these 
review meetings, in addition a peer review, was typically a design decision. The 10% 
scope meeting was included as part of the preliminary design phase, while the 50% and 
90% scope meetings were included in the detailed design phase.  Each meeting discussed 
different aspects of the project as well as the progression of the project.  The following 
table outlines the design attributes that were of relevance to the project and at which 
meetings they were discussed.  
3.2 Design Attributes 
 There are two types of design factors that were utilized in the preliminary design 
phase to narrow down all possible inlet and outlet locations: Imperative design factors 
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and achievable design factors.  The imperative design factors are attributes that could 
completely rule out a design candidate.  These design factors are as follows: 
1.  Must be in a non-safety related area 
2. Must NOT be in and around a High Energy Line Break 
3. Inlet and Outlet must be on the same elevation 
 
If a design met all of the imperative design factors, the achievable design factors 
were then used to determine the most ideal location. The achievable design factors are 
displayed in Table 3. The values associated with these attributes evolved over the design 
of the modification and are presented in the results section.  Each of these design 
attributes played a significant role in the progression and development of the 
modification, some of which were discussed at multiple meetings.   
Table 3: Achievable Design Attributes Development Overview 
 Preliminary 
Design Phase Detailed Design Phase 
Design 
Attributes 
10% Scope 
meeting? 
50% Scope 
Discussion 
90% Scope 
Discussion 
Flow Rate    
Temperature    
Pressure    
Elevation    
Location    
Operational 
Reliability 
   
Radiation    
Estimate    
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3.3 Preliminary Design Phase 
The project goal was to improve the operational flexibility of the RWCU by 
modifying the system so that it can run during a refueling outage.  A variety of 
components of the RWCU are shutdown during outages. Examples of these components 
are the feedwater line from the RWCU into the reactor, and the recirculation pumps that 
pump the reactor coolant into the RWCU. The entire RWCU system must be shut down 
simply because the feedwater line is not in operation; therefore, leaving the system 
without an outlet, hence the need for a modification to use alternate path to return to the 
reactor vessel.  A major consideration at the outlet of the project was determining if 
enough suction head was provided by the RWCU recirculation pumps to feed the reactor 
coolant into the RWCU. Fluid mechanics, specifically Bernoulli’s equation, was used to 
prove the reactor coolant could make it to the RWCU with the use of the recirculation 
pumps in the system. 
   (1) 
 The variables for this equation are all defined below. 
P1 – Atmospheric pressure  
ρ – Density of water 
v1 – Velocity of water entering the system 
v2 – Velocity of water entering the pressure header 
g – Gravity 
z1 – Height of the entrance to the system 
z2 – Height of the exit to the system 
hP – Head created from the RWCU pump 
hL – Head loss due to friction 
Q – Volumetric flow rate 
dpipe – diameter of the pipe 
Apipe – Cross sectional area of the pipe 
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The next step in the preliminary design phase was to examine all of the possible 
modification inlet and outlet locations.  Mechanical drawings of the RWCU provided a 
detailed layout of the equipment that comprises the system. From the mechanical 
drawings, the team determined potential inlet and outlet locations of the modification. For 
each potential outlet and inlet located on the relevant Piping and Instrumentation 
Diagrams [P&ID] (See Glossary) the various inlet and outlet location options were 
determined. The name and class on the relevant pipes was then found on the 
corresponding Isometric Roadmap [IRM] (See Glossary). The pipe class elicited from the 
IRM was then researched in an M300 pipe class document to determine the specifications 
of each pipe. The M300 designated the ASME/ANSI B31.1 piping modification, material 
fabrication, and inspection requirements for the piping. Also from the IRM, a Piping 
Isometric Drawing was found. The Piping Isometric Drawing showed the elevation and 
exact location of the potential inlets and outlets. The conceptual design section shows the 
four types of drawings mentioned in this paragraph and following the drawings is a table 
with information gathered from the M300.  
The most ideal inlet and outlet locations were determined based on the following 
criteria.  
• The maximum flow rate during an outage 
• Temperature differential across the RWCU during an outage 
• Pressure differential across the RWCU during an outage 
• Difference in elevation between the inlet and outlet piping modification 
• Radiation in terms of location 
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It was important for the most cost beneficial, safe, and functional modification to 
be designed.  Therefore, the need to look into each of these factors was of great 
importance for each possible design.  Of course much of this information (i.e. cost 
estimate) was not available at the time of the preliminary design phase.  Therefore, any 
decisions based on those particular factors were made using the limited information that 
had been provided at that time.  For example, it was known that running the modification 
between multiple floors was more expensive than to run the pipe through walls on the 
same elevation, therefore, inlet and outlet locations on the same floor would be more 
ideal. 
 3.3.1 10% Scope Meeting 
The design attributes listed above were used to eliminate potential inlet/outlet 
locations on an engineering judgment standpoint. The preliminary designs were presented 
before the design team in a 10% Scope Meeting. During a 10% Scope Meeting, the 
preliminary designs are discussed and evaluated according to the design attributes 
previously listed. Members on the design team gave relevant feedback regarding the pros 
and cons of each potential location.  
3.4 Detailed Design Phase 
 The detailed design phase consisted of developing a complete scope of the 
best-fit design from the preliminary design phase.  Detailed drawings, bill of materials, 
cost estimates, and dose savings estimates were outputs of this phase.  The design 
attributes used to evaluate the preliminary design were quantified in the detailed design. 
The detailed design was constructed according to the Design Considerations and 
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Engineering Change Process documents in the Nuclear Management Manual (Pilgrim 
Personnel, 2012). 
The Design Considerations document encompasses the factors that must be taken 
into consideration when modifying any nuclear system. The Design Considerations 
document contains general considerations, mechanical considerations, electrical 
considerations and foreign material exclusion [FME] considerations. These were all 
considered along with the other design attributes. 
When developing a detailed design for a piping modification to a non-safety 
related system in a nuclear power plant, the first design consideration involved project 
scoping and the problem definition. The problem definition did not change during this 
process, so the project scoping documents and problem statements were reviewed prior to 
beginning work on the detailed design.  These documents provided an outline of the 
relevant information that could be pertinent to the design modification.  The information 
from these documents that was pertinent to this project is listed as the design attributes. 
After reviewing the basic functions and critical characteristics of the RWCU, 
design conditions such as pressure, temperature and flow rate were reviewed.  This was 
necessary information to ensure that the connection between the two systems would be 
possible and compatible. 
Another relevant source of concern for the design process was the pipe class of 
the modification.  When selecting a pipe class the normal operating conditions of both the 
RWCU and FPC systems had to be considered.  It was easiest to base the modification 
off of the pipe class of the line that the modification was tying into and just ensure that 
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the pipe class in the FPC system of the outlet pipe would operate properly under those 
conditions.   
3.4.1  50% Scope Meeting  At the 50% scope meeting, it was also determined what kinds of materials would 
be necessary for the implementation of the modification.  Such materials included valves, 
pipe connections, and piping itself.  Following the 50% scope there was a lot of progress 
still to be made in the design process and in completion of cost and dose estimates. 
Subsequently, the layout arrangement requirements were evaluated. The layout 
arrangement requirements included: Fire Boundary Areas, Security considerations, piping 
configuration, plant walkdowns, and device location (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012a). The 
team conducted walkdowns to determine the piping configuration in both the RWCU and 
the FPC. The layout of the systems was partially evaluated using Panomap and live 
cameras outside the Locked High Radiation Areas [LHRA] and Very High Radiation 
Areas [VHRA].  
Following the layout and arrangement requirements, the ALARA considerations 
of the detailed design were assessed. The ALARA considerations include creation of new 
field zones, crud traps, shielding, operations, potential for reducing cobalt, effects of 
cobalt bearing alloys, and all things that will reduce dose (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012a). 
Also, the ALARA review completed by Pilgrim personnel in 2000 provided detailed 
information. 
Next the detailed design was analyzed according to the operational reliability 
design considerations. The operational reliability design considerations include plant 
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start-up, normal operation, plant shutdown, system maintenance, plant emergency 
operation, special or infrequent operations, system transients, and system transient 
operations (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012a).  
After operational reliability was analyzed, the accessibility for maintenance was 
assessed. In the design specifications manual, accessibility for maintenance cover a 
variety of topics. The topics most related to the detailed design included: accessibility for 
existing plant components and components. 
A number of general design considerations followed layout and arrangements 
requirement. These general design requirements that did not directly lend themselves to 
the project were Environmental Impacts, Discharge Impacts, Seismic specifications, 
Interface Requirements, Redundancy, Diversity, Transportation Requirements, Handling 
Requirements, Material special processes. 
Once the detailed design was complete, a cost estimate for the modification was 
performed.  The estimate was divided into two main savings categories: dose and 
monetary.  The goal was to keep both categories at a minimum.  A cost-benefit analysis 
compares the upfront costs of the implementation of the modification to the long-term 
benefits associated with the operation of the modification.  The monetary analysis 
includes all aspects from man hours to material cost.  Also, as safety is a primary concern 
in any such project, a thorough dose analysis weighed the one-time exposure during 
construction with the potential radiation exposure savings with the operational 
modification in place.   Essentially, it was successfully proved that the design that was 
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developed is not only beneficial in a monetary sense, but also in the pursuit of reducing 
worker dose. 
3.4.2 90% Scope Meeting 
 The 90% scope meeting consisted of the team presenting the final design 
including dose and cost estimates, and all the necessary paperwork to the design 
engineering department, as well as some critical stakeholders from the chemistry and 
systems operations departments at PNPS.  This meeting served as the final presentation 
for completion of the Major Qualifying Project requirements with WPI and also as a 
means of project approval through PNPS.  With the help of Pilgrim personnel, the project 
was able to be approved.   
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4. RESULTS 
 The results portion of this project consists of three sections; preliminary design, 
detailed design, and estimates for cost and worker radiation exposure levels.  These 
sections provide a cohesive explanation of the analysis process and a detailed final 
modification design that satisfies the requirements set forth by Pilgrim Nuclear Power 
Station.  
4.1 Preliminary Design 
 
The piping modification consisted of an inlet from the RWCU and an outlet to an 
appropriate system that is interconnected with the reactor vessel and is operational during 
refueling outages. The goal of the preliminary design phase consisted of developing 
multiple modification options and determining the best-fit option based on the criteria 
defined in the methodology. 
Before the teams inlets and outlets were evaluated, it was vital to clearly state the 
definitions of the words inlet and outlet. The intent of the modification was to allow flow 
of lower purity water at the bottom of the vessel to enter the RWCU, run through 
purification steps in the RWCU, then re-enter the upper portion of the reactor vessel. It 
was realized that the inlet to the modification was an outlet from the RWCU, and the 
outlet of the modification was an inlet to another system. The flow from the outlet would 
then re-enter the upper portion of the reactor vessel. For this reason, the term inlet is used 
to describe the beginning of the modification. And the term outlet is used to describe the 
end of the modification. 
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 The following sub-sections consist of potential inlets and outlets for the 
modification.  There are three inlet and four outlet options listed, along with design 
specifications and a brief description of each.  The drawings mentioned in the 
methodology that must be assembled when determining the general locations for a 
potential inlet or outlet are shown prior to each description.  
There are three inlet and four outlet options listed, along with design 
specifications and a brief description of each, which were reviewed during the 10% 
Scope meeting. Pilgrim personnel on the design team were apprised of the assessment 
Nikole Stone, Scott Gallagher, and Katherine Goldberg completed regarding each 
potential inlet and outlet using P&ID, Isometric Roadmap, Piping Isometric, and 
Elevation drawings.  
Factors that could rule a design completely were referred imperative design 
factors. The imperative design factors were as follows: 
1. Must be in a non-safety related area 
2. Must NOT be in and around a High Energy Line Break 
3. Inlet and Outlet must be on the same elevation 
 
Factors that the ideal design would accommodate were referred to as achievable 
design factors. The achievable design factors were as follows: 
1. Flow Rate 
2. Temperature  
3. Pressure 
4. Location 
5. Radiation Level 
 
The first imperative design factor required the areas selected for the modification 
be non-safety related areas. As previously stated, non-safety related areas have fewer 
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design requirements and increase the feasibility of accomplishing the modification. 
Materials required for safety related areas are also much more expensive than those 
required in non-safety related areas. The selected pipes were verified using a Q-list. A Q-
list has every safety-related area in each numbered system of the power plant.  
The second imperative design factor required the design stay outside of HELB 
areas. HELB areas impose strict limitations on modifications, require costly equipment, 
and require strict maintenance. Furthermore, a HELB struck down the modification 
proposed in 2000. 
Lastly, the third imperative design factor, elevation, was evaluated in terms of 
whether the potential inlet or outlet would require drilling through walls or floors to 
complete the modification. Drilling through walls was considered less attractive from a 
cost standpoint.  
After being assessed according to the imperative design factors, the candidates 
were analyzed according to maximum flow rate, temperature, pressure, location, radiation 
level, and elevation. Flow rate was assessed according the flow that would go through the 
selected pipe during normal operation. Normal operation refers to normal operation mode 
the most frequent mode of operation. During normal operation, demineralizer 
recirculation pumps have a flow rate of 111 gpm each, 222gpm total (Pilgrim Personnel, 
2012b). Flow rate was assessed during normal operation because the new mode of 
operation would not deviate from the flow rate used in normal operation mode.   
Temperature was assessed by comparing the temperature of the flow during 
shutdown mode to the pipe class of the pipe the modification would branch off of. As 
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previously stated, during a refueling outage or reactor shutdown mode the reactor coolant 
is approximately 140°F (Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). Each pipe class has a designated 
design temperature. Two different pipe classes could be used in modification, but the 
design temperatures of the two pipes used would need to accommodate the temperature 
of the flow during shutdown mode.  
Pressure was also assessed by evaluating the candidates according to the pressure 
of the flow during shutdown mode. During shutdown mode, the pressure of the flow 
leaving the demineralizers is 34.3psig. Stated in the previous paragraph, two different 
pipe classes could be used in the design of the modification, but both pressure classes 
would have to accommodate the pressure of the flow. 
General location and radiation level were evaluated together because some 
locations in the plant had consistently high radiation levels and ruled out specific 
locations completely. The location and radiation level of the potential inlet were crucial 
design factors because some areas and rooms in the plant have higher levels of radiation 
at any given moment during any mode of operation.  Though radiation and contamination 
can change, some rooms are consistently High Radiation Area [HRA] or Locked High 
Radiation Area. Given that the overall goal of the project was to reduce workers radiation 
dosage, it was most ideal to choose the location that would expose workers to the least 
amount of radiation during the time of implementation and maintenance.   
After members Nikole Stone, Scott Gallagher and Katherine Goldberg verbally 
evaluated each inlet and outlet candidate, the other design team members gave input 
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regarding the different locations. The information gathered from the 10% Scope meeting 
regarding the inlet and outlet.  
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4.1.1 Candidate Inlet One 
The first potential inlet was located shortly after the filter demineralizer of the 
RWCU, shown in Figure 8. Information regarding the specifications of potential inlet one 
is shown above in Table 4.  Downstream of valve MO-1201-75, the demineralizer bypass 
line joins the flow leaving the demineralizers displayed in Figure 9. The three 
dimensional layout and elevation of the pipe are shown in Figure 10 and 11 respectively.  
The temperature of the flow leaving the demineralizer was also well under the 
design temperature of the pipe class selected in the above table.  The design pressure for 
that pipe was also at 600 psig; which will more than compensate for the 34.3 psig water 
pressure running through the system during an outage. 
A known HRA was located in close proximity to Candidate Inlet One. The next 
concern was finding a portion of the length of pipe between the demineralizer and valve 
MO-1201-75 that is outside of any high radiation area.   
 Based on the information gathered in the preliminary design regarding the inlet 
location, the general area after the demineralizer was deemed an attractive location. The 
general location was considered ideal because the pipe class in that area would 
accommodate the temperature, pressure and capacity of the flow rate leaving the 
demineralizers. A walkdown of the general location would further justify whether 
candidate inlet could have a location outside a high radiation area. The more detailed 
location of potential inlet one was drawn from M-248 and IR-M248, and these drawing 
are displayed in the detailed design section. 
 
49  
 
Figure 8: M-247 P&ID for RWCU System 
 
Figure 9: IR-M247 Isometric Roadmap for RWCU System 
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Figure 10: Piping Isometric Drawing for Pipe M100BC20-3 in the RWCU System 
 
 
Figure 11: Elevation Map of Pipe M100BC-20-3  
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Table 4: Potential Inlet One Specifications 
  
Valve 
Name Pipe Name Pipe Class 
Design 
Temperature 
Design 
Pressure Elevation/Room 
MO-1201-
75 
M-100BC-
20-3 4"-EA-12 850°F 600psig 
CEL 61'-3", CEL 
61'-3" 
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4.1.2 Candidate Inlet Two 
Potential inlet two was located in close proximity to potential inlet one. The 
schematic location of the pipe is shown in Figure 12. The name of the pipe was elicited 
from Figure 13. Figures 14 and 15 illustrate a three-dimensional version and an elevation 
view respectively.  
Upon further examination during the detailed design phase, the potential inlets 
were found to be located on different P & ID drawings. They had the same pipe class and 
were both designed to handle the flow leaving the filter demineralizer.  
 The elevation of the second potential inlet made it a less attractive candidate.  The 
elevation of potential inlet listed above in table four placed it very close to the elevation 
of the regenerative heat exchangers.  This potentially put this inlet in a high radiation 
area, which could eliminate this option as a viable candidate. Given that potential inlets 
and outlets only designate general areas, the specific location could not be determined 
until a walkdown was performed. 
Though potential inlet two was in the same general area as potential outlet one, it 
was located closer to the condenser. The excess length would cause a greater amount of 
head loss in the pipe. The head loss could require more work from the one operational 
RWCU recirculation pump, which was already over-compensating due to the shutdown 
of the reactor recirculation pumps.   Therefore candidate inlet two was considered less 
attractive than Inlet one. 
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Figure 12: M-247 P&ID for RWCU System 
 
Figure 13: IR-M247 Isometric Roadmap for RWCU System 
54  
 
Figure 14: Piping Isometric Drawing for Pipe M100BC20-3 in the RWCU System 
 
Figure 15: Elevation Map of Pipe M100BC-20-3 
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Table 5: Potential Inlet Two Specifications 
 
 
  
Valve 
Name Pipe Name Pipe Class 
Design 
Temperature 
Design 
Pressure Elevation/Room 
MO-1201-
76 
M-100BC-
20-3 4"-EA-12 850°F 600psig EL. 52'-6" 
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4.1.3 Candidate Inlet Three 
The third potential inlet location was after the regenerative heat exchangers show 
in Figure 16. The pipe name in the area being evaluated was drawn from Figure 17. 
Figure 18 shows a three-dimensional view of the pipe. Figure 19 shows the general 
elevation in the area. 
This Candidate does not meet two of the imperative design factors. The pipe is 
located in a safety related area and the portion of piping located after Regenerative Heat 
Exchanger E-208-A is a HELB. Because this Candidate did not meet two of the 
imperative design factors, it was ruled out completely. 
Table 6: Potential Inlet Three Specifications 
 
Valve 
Name 
Pipe Name Pipe 
Class 
Design 
Temperature 
Design 
Pressure 
Elevation/Room 
MO-1201-
80 
M-100BC-
19-3 
4"-EA-12 850°F 600psig 58’4 
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Figure 16: M-247 P&ID for RWCU System
 
Figure 17: IR-M247 Isometric Roadmap for RWCU System 
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Figure 18: Piping Isometric Drawing for Pipe M100BC-19-3 in the RWCU System 
 
Figure 19: Elevation Map of Pipe M100BC-20 
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4.1.4 Candidate Outlet One  
During a refueling outage the Fuel Pool Cooling and demineralizer system is run 
with the Residual Heat Removal system as described previously in the AFPC mode. The 
potential outlet for the pipe modification would tie into the Fuel Pool Cooling 
Demineralizer bypass line shown in Figure 20. The pipe name in the general area was 
selected from Figure 21. Lastly, three-dimensional and elevation views are shown in 
Figures 22 and 23.  
The location of this inlet does not accommodate the imperative design factor 
requiring the inlet and outlet to be on the same elevation. Because the specific pipe 
selected required drilling through the floor, a modification to this particular pipe was 
ruled out. 
The Fuel Pool Cooling system would be the most attractive location for outlet. 
However, the general area selected and assessed in Candidate Outlet One was not 
attractive because the pipe into which the outlet would tie did not meet the pressure 
requirements and would require drilling through the floor. 
Table 7: Potential Outlet One Specifications 
 
 
Valve 
Name 
Pipe 
Name 
Pipe Class Design 
Temperature  
Design 
Pressure 
Elevation/Room 
8314M3 M100B-
1027 
8"-HA-19 500°F 150 psig 74’9 
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Figure 20: M-231 P&ID for RWCU System 
 
Figure 21: IR-M231 Isometric Roadmap for RWCU System 
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Figure 22: Piping Isometric Drawing for Pipe M100B-1027 
 
 
Figure 23: Elevation Map of Pipe M100B-1027 
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4.1.5 Candidate Outlet Two 
The second potential outlet would send the purified coolant to the Reactor Core 
Isolation Cooling system. A schematic of this location is shown in Figure 24. The 
specific pipe being evaluate was drawn from Figure 25. Figure 26 shows a three-
dimensional view of this pipe.  
 Unfortunately this system returns water to the reactor via the same feedwater line 
as the RWCU.  The feedwater is a safety related area, and therefore does meet imperative 
design factor one. Also, the elevation of the pipe would require drilling through the floor. 
This does not meet imperative design factor three. The issues surrounding an outlet in the 
RCIC deemed the system not ideal for an intertie with the RWCU. 
Table 8: Potential Outlet Two Specifications  
Valve 
Name 
Pipe Name Pipe 
Class 
Design 
Temperature  
Design 
Pressure 
Elevation/Room 
N/A M-100-
539-7 
6"-DL-6 850°F 900psig 31’ 
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Figure 24: M-252 SH2 P&ID for RWCU System 
 
Figure 25: IR-M252 SH2 Isometric Roadmap for RWCU System 
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Figure 26: Piping Isometric Drawing for Pip M-100-539-7 
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4.1.6 Candidate Outlet Three 
The third potential outlet possessed a number of conceptual design issues that 
made it less attractive.  This outlet tied directly into the feedwater line from the RWCU 
back into the reactor vessel shown in Figure 27. The pipe name was elicited from Figure 
28, and a three-dimensional version of the pipe in show in Figure 29. As previously 
mentioned, during normal RWCU operation, the filtered reactor coolant is returned to the 
reactor vessel via the feedwater system; however, during a refueling outage feedwater 
line A is shut off and is a safety related area.  
 Because of the general location of potential outlet three with respect to the 
RWCU system, this outlet was only compatible with potential inlet candidate three. As 
mentioned previously, the pipeline after the regenerative heat exchanger 208-A is located 
in a safety-related area. Therefore, it was not desirable area for the modification.  
Table 9: Potential Outlet Three Specifications 
 
 
 
Valve 
Name 
Pipe Name 
Pipe 
Class 
Design 
Temperature 
Design 
Pressure 
Elevation/Room 
N/A 
M-100-
538-5 6"-DL-6 850°F 900psig N/A 
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Figure 27: M-245 P&ID for RWCU System 
 
Figure 28: IR-M245 Isometric Roadmap for RWCU System 
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Figure 29: Piping Isometric Drawing for Pipe M100-538-5 
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4.1.7 Candidate Outlet Four 
Potential outlet four would have discharged purified reactor coolant into the FPC 
system, shown in Figure 30.  The pipe name was elicited from Figure 31. Three-
dimensional and elevation views are shown by Figures 32 and 33 respectively.  
The FPC contains one demineralizer located downstream from this outlet.  This 
posed a problem because this potential outlet would send the purified coolant through a 
second demineralizer. Despite the redundant purification step, the unnecessary flow 
through the FPC demineralizer would use more resin. Using more resin is not cost 
effective and is also expensive to dispose.  It was more ideal to put the outlet at another 
the location in the FPC downstream of the demineralizer. 
A design issue with potential outlet four is incompatibility with the pipe class. 
The pipe class mentioned above in the Table 7 only has a design pressure of 150 psig.  
Based on the design attributes, the pipe to which the modification ties into must be of 
great enough design pressure to handle the in-coming flow from the RWCU.  Although 
the difference in diameter between the potential inlets and this outlet would alleviate 
some of the pressure differential, there would need to be a pressure orifice to keep the 
flow within the design pressure of the outlet pipe. Selection of a different pipe within the 
same system could easily solve this compatibility issue. 
Table 10: Potential Outlet 4 Specifications 
Valve 
Name Pipe Name 
Pipe 
Class 
Design 
Temperature 
Design 
Pressure Elevation/Room 
6" 29M3 M100BC151-3 
6"-HA-
19 500°F 150 psig 
between 77'-7" and 
80'-6" 
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Figure 30: M-231 P&ID for RWCU System 
 
 
Figure 31: IR-M231 Isometric Roadmap for RWCU System 
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Figure 32: Piping Isometric Drawing for Pipe M100BC-151-3 
 
 
Figure 33: Elevation Map of Pipe M100BC-151-3 
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Preliminary Design Summary 
  During the Preliminary Design Phase, the most attractive location for inlet 
from the RWCU and outlet from to the reactor vessel was determined according to 
maximum flow rate, temperature, pressure, location, radiation level, and elevation. From 
the information gathered during the Preliminary Design Phase, it was determined that the 
most attractive inlet was inlet 1. None of the outlets were selected as most ideal, but the 
Fuel Pool Cooling System was deemed the most ideal for the intertie. Table 11 
summarizes the imperative design factors for each possible inlet and outlet.   
Table 11: Evaluation of Imperative Design Factors  
 Candidate Inlets Candidate Outlets 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 
Crucial 
Design 
Factor 1 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✕ 
 
✓ 
 
✕ ✕ 
✓ 
 
Crucial 
Design 
Factor 2 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✕ 
✓ 
 
✕ 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
Crucial 
Design 
Factor 3 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
 
✕ 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✕ 
 
The designs that were not ruled out by the crucial design factors were then 
assessed according to the achievable design factors, summarized in Table 12. 
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Table 12: Evaluation of Achievable Design Factors 
Achievable Design Factor Candidate Inlets 
 1 2 
Flow Rate 
✓ 
222 GPM 
✓ 
222 22 GPM 
Temperature 
✓ 
140 40 °F 
✓ 
140140 40 °F 
Pressure 
✓ 
34.3 psig 
✓ 
34 4.3 psig 
Location 
✓ 
elevation 51’ 
✓ 
elevation 51’ 
Radiation Level 
✓ 
not HRA or VHRA 
✕ 
VHRA 
 
 The FPC system deemed to be the most ideal outlet location, however, a pipe in 
the FPC that was on the same elevation, 51’, needed to be found to avoid drilling through 
the floor. 
4.2 Detailed Design 
 The goal of the detailed design phase was to produce a complete scope and 
estimate for the piping modification, as well as fill out all the necessary paperwork to 
have the project approved by PNPS.  The inlet and outlet locations were narrowed down 
based on the information listed in the preliminary design summary.  The detailed design 
phase consisted of developing a piping isometric drawing of the modification, completing 
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a cost estimate, filling out the Site Integrated Project Database [SIPD] paperwork, and 
presenting the final design to the engineers at PNPS.    
 4.2.1 50% Scope Design Phase  In the 50% Scope of the detailed design phase, several aspects of the design were addressed and analyzed and increased the maturity of the design. A name was given to the new mode of operation the modification would provide, Alternate Injection (AI) Mode. At the outset of 50% phase, it was recognized that AI mode of operation would enhance decay heat removal of the system during refueling, which was an initial goal of a modification proposed in 2000. Estimation of the pressure head to necessary to drive the flow from the RWCU through the FPC was performed. Finally, the following aspects of the design progressed:  
• Pipe identification of inlet and outlet locations,  
• specifications for operating conditions,  
• selection of pipe class, valve, and weldolet.  
4.2.1.1 Enhanced Decay Heat Removal 
The outline of the modification proposed in 2000 illuminated new benefits to 
constructing an intertie between the RWCU and FPC. An intertie between the RWCU 
and FPC would maximize decay heat removal during a refueling outage. Phase one of the 
modification proposed in 2000 provided detailed information that directly applied to the 
selected detailed design of this modification. The purpose of the previous design was to 
optimize thermal efficiency by operating the RWCU as a back-up to RHR. This tangible 
benefit of the modification designed in 2000 became an additional benefit for this project.  
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 As mentioned in the Background, phase one of the project developed in 2000 
explained that an intertie between the FPC and RWCU bypassing the regenerative heat 
exchangers would remove heat at a rate of 12MBtu/Hr at 210°F (Pilgrim Personnel, 
2000a). In order to exploit this modification for decay removal, the modification would 
need to operational during shutdown. Given that the scope of this project did not include 
operation procedures, the operation of the modification to maximize decay heat removal 
would need to be surveyed in a separate project.  
 4.2.1.2 Outlet Discharge Head Pressure 
Given that RWCU is a high-pressure system and the FPC is a low-pressure 
system, the design specifications for the chosen pipes selected were specifically 
evaluated. The pipe class of the inlet to the modification was EA. The design pressure of 
an EA class pipe is 850°F at 600psig pressure. For any pipe class, the pressure it is able 
to withstand depends on the pressure class and the temperature of the flow. The pressure 
class information for pipe class EA is located in Table 8. The pipe in the FPC selected for 
outlet to the modification was M100B1026. The information regarding the outlet location 
pressure class is in Table 9.  
The outlet pressure highlighted in yellow in the Bernoulli’s equation and 
designated P2 had to be higher than the discharge head pressure of pipe M100B1026 
selected for the outlet. The discharge head pressure for the pipe M100B1026 during a 
refueling outage is 42.5psi (M538, 1996). For the intertie between the RWCU and FPC to 
be successful, the flow during a refueling outage had to be higher than 42.5 psi. The 
calculation performed using Bernoulli’s equation proved the pressure of the flow coming 
from the RWCU could overcome the discharge head pressure of pipe M100B1026. 
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The flow leaving the RWCU demineralizers would be a nominal 222 GPM 
(Pilgrim Personnel, 2012b). As mentioned previously, during a refueling outage AFPC is 
run. Because RHR is run in congruence with FPC, it had to be ensured that the flow 
added by the modification would not pose a design issue.  To make sure this modification 
would be possible a calculation was completed to check the feasibility of the potential 
inlets and outlets.  
 
 The variables for this equation are all defined below. 
P1 – Atmospheric pressure  
ρ – Density of water 
v1 – Velocity of water entering the system 
v2 – Velocity of water entering the pressure header 
g – Gravity 
z1 – Height of the entrance to the system 
z2 – Height of the exit to the system 
hP – Head created from the RWCU pump 
hL – Head loss due to friction 
Q – Volumetric flow rate 
dpipe – diameter of the pipe 
Apipe – Cross sectional area of the pipe 
 
 
First, the variables with known values had to be listed. 
Variables 
 
 
P1 14.7psi 1.014 10
5
× m 1− kg s 2−⋅⋅=:=
g 9.807m s 2−⋅=
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Secondly, the velocity entering the system from the reactor vessel had to be 
determined. 
 
Next, the actual velocity of the flow in the pipe was determined by dividing 
volumetric flow rate by the area of the opening of the orifice. 
Variables 
 
 
 
Equations 
 
ρ 62.3
lb
ft3
997.95m 3− kg⋅=:=
z2 85ft 25.908m=:=
z1 145in 3.683m=:=
hP 468ft 142.646m=:=
hL 1000ft .0002⋅ 0.061m=:=
Q 220gpm 0.014m3 s 1−⋅=:=
v1
Q1 220gpm 0.014m
3 s 1−⋅=:=
dpipe 28in:=
dpipe 0.711m=
Apipe π
dpipe
2






2
:=
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Solutions 
 
 
Then, the velocity of the water exiting the piping modification was found by 
dividing volumetric flow rate by the area of the opening of the orifice. 
Variables 
 
 
 
Equations 
 
 
Solutions 
 
v1
Q1
Apipe
:=
Apipe 0.397m
2
=
v1 0.035m s
1−
⋅=
Q1 220gpm 0.014m
3 s 1−⋅=:=
dpipe 4.0in:=
dpipe 0.102m=
Apipe π
dpipe
2






2
:=
v2
Q1
Apipe
:=
Apipe 8.107 10
3−
× m2=
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Finally, the pressure of the outlet based on the variables given was solved for. 
Equation 
 
 
 
 During refueling mode the pressure of the flow leaving the RWCU demineralizer 
was determined to be 34.3 psig (Pilgrim Personnel, 2000c). The pressure class 
information displayed in Tables 8 and 9 proved the pipes could withstand the temperature 
and pressure of the flow during refueling mode. Despite the low design pressure of the 
outlet into the FPC, the pipe was eight inches in diameter. As mentioned in the 
preliminary design, an increase in cross sectional area reduces the overall pressure 
applied to the pipe.  
4.2.1.3 Pipe Identification of Inlet and Outlet Locations 
Based on the information from the preliminary design phase, it was determined 
that the most ideal inlet location to the modification would be the general location 
following the RWCU demineralizers and downstream of valve 1201-75.  The specific 
pipe selected was a 4”EA pipe named M100BC203-7SF. 
 The preliminary design phase also determined that the most ideal outlet location 
would be after the demineralizer in the FPC. The specific pipe selected was an 8” HA 
v2 1.712m s
1−
⋅=
P2 P1 ρ
v1
2 v2
2
−


2
⋅+ ρ g⋅ z1 z2−( )⋅+ ρ g⋅ hL⋅( )− ρ g⋅ hP⋅( )+:=
P2 185.33 psi⋅=
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pipe class and was named M100B1026.  It was determined both pipes selected for the 
intertie would be able to process the feed leaving the RWCU.  
4.2.1.4 Specification of Operating Conditions 
 It is important to understand the normal operating conditions of the RWCU and 
FPC systems so that it can be ensured that operation in AI mode will run smoothly.  The 
following tables outline the normal operating conditions and design specifications of both 
systems. 
Table 13: RWCU Conditions During Normal Operation (M300, 2013) 
Pipe 
Class 
Service 
Description 
Design 
Pressure 
(psig) 
Design 
Temp. 
(˚F) 
Normal 
Operating 
Pressure 
(psig) 
Normal 
Operating 
Temp. 
(˚F) 
Max 
Operating 
Pressure 
(psig) 
Max 
Operating 
Temp. 
(˚F) 
EA E216B to 
E206C Inlet 
1175 545 1175 120 1362 545 
 
Table 14: FPC Conditions During Normal Operation (M300, 2013) 
Pipe 
Class 
Service 
Description 
Design 
Pressure 
(psig) 
Design 
Temp. 
(˚F) 
Normal 
Operating 
Pressure 
(psig) 
Normal 
Operating 
Temp. 
(˚F) 
Max 
Operating 
Pressure 
(psig) 
Max 
Operating 
Temp. 
(˚F) 
HA 
T-204 to 
Fuel Pool 175 165 130 110 175 165 
 
The large difference in operating pressure between the two systems was of 
greatest concern in this case, and was the driving force for the piping selection for the 
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modification.  The piping selection is crucial for the safe and effective operation of the 
piping modification during AI mode. 
 The specifications of the modification for the development of AI mode are based 
on the criteria described in the previous table.  AI mode has to be able to be designed to 
accommodate the normal operating conditions of both the RWCU and FPC systems.  In 
this case the pipe class EA was selected for the modification because it is more durable 
than the HA tie in the FPC.  Given that the flow leaving the RWCU demineralizers will 
always be less than 130˚F, the inlet flow to the modification during AI mode was 
assumed to operate under the conditions listed in the following table. 
Table 15: Modification Inlet Conditions During AI Mode (Pilgrim Personnel, 2000c) 
Pipe Class Flow Rate (GPM) Temperature (˚F) Pressure (psig) 
EA 222 125 34.3 
 
  4.2.1.5 Pipe Class Selection 
The selected pipe specifications for the modification ensure that the pipe will be able to 
handle the volume, temperature and pressure of the process water passing through during 
AI mode.  These specifications are listed in the following table. 
Table 16: AI Mode Modification Piping Specifications (M300, 2013) 
Pipe Class Material Description Schedule Material Specification 
4” EA stainless steel 80 2.5” or larger 
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4.2.1.6 Valve Selection 
The detailed design of the modification also includes an inboard isolation valve.  
This valve is used to open and close the flow into the modification during AI mode.  The 
design of the valve must accommodate the flow, pressure and temperature of the process 
water passing through the system.  The specifications for the necessary valve are listed in 
the table below. 
Table 17: AI Mode Inboard Isolation Valve Design Specifications (M300, 2013) 
Pipe Class Material Description Pressure Class (lb) Material Specification 
4” EA stainless steel 600 2.5” to 10” 
 
 There are two different types of valves that are optional for the inboard isolation 
valve.  A globe valve is capable of varying the flow into the modification pipe, whereas a 
gate valve would either completely shut off access to the pipe or allow maximum flow to 
the pipe.  The pros and cons of each type of valve are outlined in the diagram below. 
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Figure 34: Globe Valves vs. Gate Valves 
These pros and cons weigh heavily into the final modification designed are 
discussed in greater detail in the 90% Scope Meeting section.  At the time of the 50% 
design phase, both valves were still under consideration.  The following table outlines the 
material specification options for the inboard isolation valve. 
Table 18: AI Mode Inboard Isolation Valve Material Specifications (M300, 2013) 
Valve Type Valve Mark Numbers 
Globe N136M3 
Gate N14M3 
  
 Due to the large difference in operating pressure between the RWCU and FPC 
systems during normal operation, a malfunction of the primary isolation valve during AI 
mode could damage the FPC system. For this reason, the installation of secondary 
Valve Type 
Globe Valve Pros Can be throttled to adjust flow Cons More expensive 
Gate Valve Pros Less expensive Cons Only operates at maximum flow capacity 
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isolation valve was considered.  The design and material specifications for the secondary 
isolation valve would be the same as those listed for the primary isolation valve.  The 
decision for implementation of the secondary isolation valve would consider the cost 
versus the severity of the damage that could be caused pending the failure of the primary 
valve. 
 Both valves would have the option of being automated or operated manually.  
These manners of operation were reviewed for safety and cost related issues in order to 
ensure that the most realistic design was constructed.  For the purposes of integrity and 
ensuring all possibilities are considered, the pros and cons of both manners of operations 
are outlined in the following figure. 
 
Figure 35: Manual vs. Automated Valve Operation 
 Worker dose that can be accumulated during AI mode operation is part of the 
achievable design factors.  The modification from 2000 outlined the specific worker dose 
Valve Operation 
Manual Pros Less expensive Cons Regular dose accumulation 
Automated 
Pros No dose accumulation 
Cons 
More expensive 
Not as reliable 
Requires preventative maintenance 
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that would be accumulated during a refueling outage to manually operate these valves.  
The details are outlined in the table below. 
Table 19: Dose Associated with Manual Valve Operation (Pilgrim Personnel, 2000b) 
RWCU/FPC 
Operation During 
Each RFO 
(man-hrs) 
Effective Dose Rate 
(rem/hr) 
Estimated Dose 
(man-rem) 
Intertie / Bypass 2.0 0.02 0.04 
 
 The pros and cons of the different valve types and manners of operations along 
with a final valve choice were considered in greater detail in the 90% design phase. 
4.1.1.7 Weldolet Connection to FPC 
  Due to the difference in pipe size between the modification inlet and outlet, a 
weldolet would have to be implemented on the dispersal end to connect the 4” 
modification pipe to the 8” return line in FPC.  There was some discretion about whether 
the outlet should intersect the FPC line due to the presence of valve 19-HO-188.  The 
intertie could be implemented either up-stream or down-stream of this valve depending 
on the feasibility and benefits of each location.   
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4.2.2 90% Scope Design Phase 
The final, 90% phase of the detailed design addressed in detail all remaining aspects of 
the design and resulted in detailed drawings, bill of materials, cost estimates, and dose 
savings estimates for the modification.  
 The first design decision in this phase concerned a gate valve to be used to isolate 
the modification because there is no need to throttle (See Glossary) the valve. 
4.2.2.1 Precise location of Outlet Upstream of 19-HO-188 
The second matter considered in the 90% phase was the benefits of placing the 
outlet upstream or downstream of valve 19-HO-188. The image below is of a valve; 
specifically valve 19-HO-188, which was located in close proximity to the outlet of the 
modification into FPC.  The placement of the outlet to the modification both upstream 
(See Glossary) and downstream (See Glossary) of valve 19-HO-188 posed specific 
benefits. 
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Figure 36: M231 Valve 19-HO-188 
 If the outlet to the modification was located downstream, the flow could have 
only been discharged into the spent fuel pool. Also, a walkdown confirmed downstream 
of the valve was extremely obstructed by previously installed piping.  Furthermore, there 
is a hot spot (See Glossary) at the connection of the two pipes shown in Figure 36 
downstream of valve 19-HO-188. Hot spots are generally contaminated or high radiation 
areas, so they are not ideal for a piping modification for dose reasons.  
 Installing the outlet upstream of valve 19-HO-188 posed less design constraints 
than upstream. If the outlet to the modification was located upstream, the flow could be 
discharged to different locations. If valve 19-H0-188 is open, the flow will be discharged 
into the spent fuel pool. If valve 19-HO-188 is closed, the flow can be discharged into the 
reactor basin. Given that the flow would be of high purity, the reactor basin was 
considered a more ideal location.   
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 Installing the outlet upstream of valve 19-HO-188 was also considered more 
practical after the team completed a walkdown of the Fuel Pool Corridor. There is a wall 
adjacent to the upstream location, and it could be used to run the length of pipe. The lack 
of obstruction and diverse discharge options made upstream of valve 19-HO-188 a more 
ideal location for the outlet. 
  4.2.2.1 Piping Isometric Drawing 
 A piping isometric drawing is essential for understanding the exact dimensions 
and location of the modification, as well as physically visualizing the modification.  The 
use of the piping isometrics for the inlet, M100BC-203-7SF, and outlet, M100B1026, 
locations, as well as drawing M19, all of which can be found in Appendix C, allowed for 
the development of a new piping isometric for the modification.  Using the same 
coordinate system as all other available drawings, the following piping isometric was 
developed. 
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Figure 37: Piping Isometric Drawing of Modification 
 This is a basic piping isometric drawing that would be used for the 
implementation of the modification.  It includes all necessary dimensions, elevations, 
reference pipes, valves and support locations for a complete understanding of the piping.  
For visualization purposes, a second copy of the piping isometric has been included in 
Figure 38.  This drawing includes a 3-D representation of the wall through which the 
modification travels, the relative location of the pipe to the back wall of the FPC corridor 
and RWCU holding pump room, as well as a few highlighted reference locations. 
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Figure 38: Piping Isometric Drawing for Modification with Extended Features 
 This allows for a better understand of the piping layout and modification function.  
The entire pipe is highlighted in blue for easy reference.  Highlighted in green is the tee 
that connects the mod to the outlet from the RWCU holding pump room.  The isolation 
valve that would be implemented to control flow during AI mode is pictured in red.  
When this valve is open the flow will pass from the RWCU, through the valve, up and 
through the wall of the RWCU holding pump room and into the FPC corridor.  The pipe 
travels along the back wall of the corridor and finally turns off to connect to the FPC line.  
Lastly, the weldolet that connects the modification to the FPC line is highlighted in 
orange.  The piping isometric shows the location of the piping relative to gridlines K and 
13.  This gives a reference point for the modification so that other drawings that may or 
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may not include the modification can be put into perspective with the new piping.  All 
“EL” values give the piping elevation at that particular location relative to the ground.  
The floor level of the drawing is show in the bottom left corner of the drawing at a value 
of 74’0”. 
 Following the pipe design, a list of necessary materials had to be developed to 
begin the estimate portion of the design. 
   4.2.2.2 Materials 
 
 The materials lists followed the discussion regarding the piping isometric in the 
90% Scope Meeting. The following is a list of all the materials necessary for 
implementation of the modification. The column QA designates whether the part needed 
was safety related or not. As previously stated, for a number of reasons the team chose all 
non-q or non-safety related materials. The Catalog Identification [ID] (See Glossary) and 
IAS description (See Glossary) column were drawn from a program called Asset Suite©.  
Direct access to Asset Suite was originally unavailable but was gained via the design 
team member. The program contains information for all parts ordered by the plant. For 
any listed material Catalog ID, the corresponding price and potential warehouse location 
was elicited. It was imperative to use Asset Suite© because many material necessary for 
the modification were already in the warehouse ready for implementation. Though not 
every material has Catalog ID number, the prices elicited from the Catalog ID allowed 
the materials estimate for the AI modification to be calculated. 
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Table 20: EA Pipes and Fittings 
QA 
 
Catalog ID. 
 
IAS Description Quantity Required 
Non-Q 
 
00PIL33999 
 
valve, gate, *,033907, 
4x600#, SST, a-351, 
316, SCH80, CF8M, 
ANC 
 
1 
Non-Q 
 
00PIL90491 
 
PIPE, S.S, ASTM A-
312 SEAMLESS, TP-
304 GR 4", SCH 80, 
10 
 
50ft 
Non-Q 
 
00PIL82861 
 
ELBOW, PIPE, *, 
009842, 4, 
45DEG,LR, SCH 80, 
A-403, GRWP316 
 
4 
Non-Q 
 
00PIL92528 
 
ELBOW, PIPE, *, 
009927, 4, 90DEG, 
LR, SCH80, A-403, 
GRWO304, BW 
 
6 
Non-Q 00PIL82862 
 
TEE PIPE, *, 031840, 
4x4x4, SCH80, A-403, 
GRWP 316 
 
1 
 
Table 21: HA2 Pipes and Fittings 
QA Catalog ID. IAS Description Quantity 
Non-Q NOT FOUND IN IAS NOT FOUND IN IAS 1 
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Table 22: Structural Materials 
QA 
 
Catalog ID. 
 
IAS Description Quantity Required 
Non-Q 32074301 
 
PLATE, CS, A36, 
1/2"THK, 12" WD, 12" 
LG 
 
3 
Non-Q 00PIL29628 
 
ANGLE, *, 000549, 
3x3x1/4 X20' CS HOT 
DIPPED 
 
3 
Non-Q 00PIL83275 
 
BOLT, ANCHOR, *, 
003746, 3/4X8, CS, 
KWIK, II, HILTI 
00045377 
 
12 
Non-Q NOT FOUND IN IAS NOT FOUND IN IAS 3 
 
 
 Based on the list of materials necessary for the construction of the modification 
and the corresponding prices found in Asset Suite©, a materials estimate was developed. 
4.2.2.3 Cost Estimate  The overall project estimate consists of two parts: a bill of materials, and man-
hours.  These are the two components of the estimate that are of relevance to this 
particular project and are all that was required by PNPS for the completion of the project 
estimate. 
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 The bill of materials below in Table 23s, Table 24, and Table 25 , outlines the 
individual cost of all the necessary materials as well as a total material cost.  
Table 23: EA pipes and Fittings 
Description of 
Material 
Technical 
Requirements 
Cost per unit Cost for material 
4” Gate Valve 
ANSI B16.34 
Pressure Class 600lb 
N14M3 
 
Maximum Carbon 
Content 0.035% 
For All Grades 
ASME SA Materials 
May Be Used 
For M300 Pipe Class 
EA 
 
15,772.00 
 
15,772.00 
 
4" Schedule 80 
Seamless Stainless 
Steel Pipe 
ASTM A-312 Gr 
TP304 
ASTM A-312 Gr 
TP316LN 
ASTM A-376 Gr 
TP316L 
ASTM A-376 Gr 
TP304 
 
Maximum Carbon 
Content 0.035% 
For All Grades 
ASME SA Materials 
May Be Used 
For M300 Pipe Class 
EA 
 
95.88 
 
4794.00 
 
4" 45 Deg Long 
Radius Elbow 
Buttwelding Ends 
Schedule 80 Stainless 
Steel 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP304 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP304-W 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP316L 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
Maximum Carbon 
Content 0.035% 
For All Grades 
ASME SA Materials 
May Be Used 
For M300 Pipe Class 
EA 
 
94.86 
 
379.44 
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WP316LN 
 
4" 90 Deg Long 
Radius Elbow 
Buttwelding Ends 
Schedule 80 Stainless 
Steel 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP304 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP304-W 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP316L 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP316LN 
 
Maximum Carbon 
Content 0.035% 
For All Grades 
ASME SA Materials 
May Be Used 
For M300 Pipe Class 
EA 
 
195.58 
 
1173.48 
 
4" Straight Tee 
Buttwelding Ends 
Schedule 80 Stainless 
Steel 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP304 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP304-W 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP316L 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP316LN 
 
Maximum Carbon 
Content 0.035% 
For All Grades 
ASME SA Materials 
May Be Used 
For M300 Pipe Class 
EA 
 
173.41 
 
173.41 
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Table 24: HA2 Pipes and Fittings 
Description of 
Material 
Technical 
Requirements 
Cost per unit Cost for material 
4" Butt Welding 
Outlet for 8" Run 
Weldolet or Trans-O-
Con 
Schedule 40 Stainless 
Steel 
ASTM A-403 Gr 
WP316L 
ASTM A-182 Gr 
F316L 
 
Maximum Carbon 
Content 0.035% 
For All Grades 
ASME SA Materials 
May Be Used 
For M300 Pipe Class 
HA2 
 
130.00 130.00 
 
Table 25: Structural Materials 
Description of 
Material 
Technical 
Requirements 
Cost per unit Cost for material 
Carbon Steel Plate 
A36 
12”x 12”x 1/2” Thick 
 
A36 Carbon Steel 
 
100 300 
Carbon Steel Angle 
A36 
3”x 3”x 1/4”  
w/ insulating pad 
 
A36 Carbon Steel 
 
341.24 1023.72 
HILTI QUICK 
BOLTS 
 
n/a 5.39 64.68 
Stainless 4” U-bolt 
Double Nut 
SST 50 150 
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Based on the bill of materials above the total cost of all necessary materials for 
construction of this modification is $23,960.73.  However, this does not cover man-hour 
costs for design and implementation of the modification.  This is further explained in the 
following sections. 
4.2.2.4 Man Hours Cost of Implementation 
 
 To calculate the man-hours cost of implementation, all the types of work needing 
to be done were identified and hourly rates were researched.  After deciding what work 
needed to be done, the amount of time needed for each task was researched.  Once the 
hourly rates were found, the amount of hours needed for each task was entered into the 
Man Hours Cost of Implementation Excel sheet and the total cost was calculated.  
 
 
Figure 39: Man hours Template Portion 
 
 
Figure 40: Man hours Total Estimate 
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TOTAL IMPLEMENTATION + TOTAL MATERIALS 
153, 450.00 + 23,960.73= 177,410.73 
 
4.2.2.5 Dose Calculation 
 The calculation of dose savings was obtained shortly after the 90% Scope 
Meeting from the ALARA Supervisor. The ALARA supervisor works in the Radiation 
Protection Department at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. An ALARA is one of the 
individuals who determine the maximum dose for nuclear plant each year. The maximum 
occupational dose is the sum every individuals occupational dose for that year. For 
example, In 2012 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station set a goal to keep the maximum 
occupational radiation dose  less than 25 Rem for approximately 650 workers (Pilgrim 
Personnel, personal communication, January, 9, 2013). While conducting research onsite 
at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, the team witnessed Pilgrim accomplish their goal of 
less than 25 Rem in 2012.  
 For realistic and achievable maximum occupational dose limits to be set, the 
ALARA Supervisor must have a working knowledge of dose accumulation for 
modification in different parts of the nuclear plant. For this reason, he was charged with 
the task of determining the amount of occupational dose the modification would reduce 
per refueling outage.  
 When making dose calculations, the ALARA Supervisor determines the dose 
calculations by references dose accumulated during similar modifications. However, the 
modification the team designed had only been successfully designed and installed in one 
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other nuclear power plant in the United States (Pilgrim Personnel, personal 
communication, March 29, 2013).   
Because the modification concept itself was relatively new, the ALARA 
Supervisor drew his dose savings calculation from other nuclear power plants developing 
similar designs and dose calculations from prior refueling outages. When the refuel 
cavity is flooded, the dose rates associated with the cavity are 12mrem/hr (Pilgrim 
Personnel, personal communication, March 29, 2013). As previously stated, the 
radioactive contaminants swept into the reactor coolant during the shutdown process 
largely contribute to the high dose rate around the refuel cavity. Approximately 36 hours 
after the refuel cavity is flooded, AFPC mode is initiated (Pilgrim Personnel, personal 
communication, March 29, 2013).  AFPC mode lowers the dose rates around the refuel 
cavity but does nothing to lower the initially high 12mrem/hr dose rate. After the 
implementation of the modification, RWCU Alternate Injection mode would significantly 
reduce the dose in the area around the refuel cavity prior to the initiation of AFPC mode 
(Pilgrim Personnel, personal communication, March 29, 2013).  Based on the information 
provided, the conservative estimate for the occupational dose the modification would 
save every refueling outage was 2,000mrem (Pilgrim Personnel, personal 
communication, March 29, 2013).   
4.3 Detailed Design Summary 
During the Detailed Design Phase, it was determined the modification would 
connect pipe M100BC203-7SF in the RWCU to pipe M100B1026 in the FPC. Because 
pipe M100BC203-7SF had a higher durability than pipe M100B1026, the pipe class EA 
of M100BC203-7 was selected for the material specification. The material selected for 
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the pipes and fittings was determined to accommodate the maximum rate, temperature, 
and pressure of the flow leaving the demineralizer in the RWCU.  
It was determined the modification would begin in the holding pump room on the 
51’ elevation with manually operated gate valve. The holding pump room is generally 
classified as a HRA, but it only required the modification to go through a wall rather than 
a floor. The pipe would run through the holding pump wall and connect with pipe 
M100B1026 in the Fuel Pool Corridor via a weldolet. A walkdown of the areas was 
performed, and it was concluded building the modification in the selected areas was 
feasible. 
The proper design materials were listed and then researched in IAS. From the 
Catalog ID numbers found, an estimate for the cost of materials was determined. The 
Design team used a man hours template to develop an estimate for the personnel cost for 
the modification. The total cost for man hours and materials was 177,410.73. ALARA 
supervisor at Pilgrim calculated the occupational dose that the implementation of the 
modification could save. He determined the occupational dose saved by the modification 
every refueling outage would conservatively be 2000mrem (Pilgrim Personnel, personal 
communication, March 29, 2013). 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
The goal of the project was to improve the operational flexibility of the RWCU 
system and reduce personnel exposure to Cobalt-60. Non-radioactive cobalt is a 
component of the valve hard facing alloy Stellite. Over time Stellite is eroded by reactor 
coolant causing non-radioactive cobalt to seep into the reactor coolant. When the non-
radioactive cobalt is in the reactor coolant, it can pick up a neutron and become 
radioactive. The radioactive material settles on the primary piping, but when the reactor 
is shutdown for a refueling outage the radioactive layer is disturbed and mixes with 
reactor coolant (Pilgrim Personnel, personal communication, March 29, 2013). The 
presence of the radioactive cobalt in the reactor coolant causes high dose rates during a 
refueling outage (Pilgrim Personnel, personal communication, March 29, 2013). In 
addition, the removal of the Cobalt-60 is costly and prolongs the refueling outage. If the 
RWCU could be utilized, the radioactive layer could be filtered reducing personnel 
exposure considerably.  
In 2000, a member of the MCSDE department developed a design for an intertie 
between the RWCU and FPC. Despite the tangible benefits of the modification, a HELB 
in the RWCU struck down the design. After meticulous work with members of the 
MCSDE department, a feasible intertie between the RWCU and FPC was developed. The 
intertie designed would improve the operational flexibility of the RWCU by allowing it 
to operate during a refueling outage. At the end of the 90% Scope Meeting on March 13, 
2013, the design approved and sent to upper management for financial approval. 
Given that Stellite is used in valves in almost every nuclear power plant, 
modifications involving RWCU operational flexibility are still being developed in 
101  
nuclear power plants all over the country. However, only one nuclear power plant has 
successfully implemented a design. Unfortunately, information regarding the successful 
modification design was not documented or available to the team. For this reason, the 
design team documented every phase and aspect of the modification. The meticulous 
documentation of the modification can now serve as guideline to other BWR power 
plants trying to reduce personnel exposure to Cobalt-60. 
 As stated above, the approved design for the modification will lessen the amount 
of time needed for a refueling outage. At the present time, personnel must remove the 
radioactive material from the reactor coolant prior to refueling.  After the modification is 
implemented, the RWCU can filter out the Cobalt-60 directly after the scramming 
process.  
 The most important aspect of the modification is the occupational dose it will 
prevent after implementation. While completing research on site at Pilgrim Nuclear 
Power Station, the team witnessed the profound importance on reducing occupational 
radiation dose. The conservative estimate for personnel exposure saved by the 
modification every refueling outage was 2000mrem (Pilgrim Personnel, personal 
communication, March 29, 2013).  For a refueling outage year, the maximum 
occupational radiation dose is <37 Rem (Pilgrim Personnel, personal communication, 
March 13, 2013).  The implementation of the modification would lower the maximum 
occupational radiation dose each refueling outage following the implementation.  
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In conclusion, the implementation of the modification will serve as model for 
other nuclear plants attempting the modification, reduce outage time, and reduce 
occupational radiation exposure for outage personnel. The implementation of the 
modification will benefit Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for the duration of its existence. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Abbreviations 
 
AFPC – Augmented Fuel Pool Cooling 
AFPC & P – Augmented Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification 
ALARA – As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
BWR – Boiling Water Reactor 
EPA – Environmental Protection Agency 
FME – Foreign Material Exclusion 
FPC – Fuel Pool Cooling 
GE – General Electric 
HELB – High Energy Line Break 
HRA – High Radiation Area 
HX – Heat Exchanger 
IRM – Isometric Roadmap 
LHRA – Locked High Radiation Area 
MSCD – Mechanical Structural Civil Engineering Department 
NEI – New England Energy Institute 
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PC – Protective Clothing 
PNPS – Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 
PWR – Pressurized Water Reactor 
P&ID – Piping and Instrumentation Diagram 
RA – Radiation Area 
RCIC – Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 
RFO – Refueling Outage 
RHR – Residual Heat Removal System 
RP – Radiological Personnel 
RWCU – Reactor Water Cleanup 
SIPD – Site Integrated Project Database  
USNRC – United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
VHRA – Very High Radiation Area 
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Appendix B: Glossary 
Activated Fission Products (noun) – nuclides formed during the transformation of stable 
reactor components 
Catalog ID (noun) – reference number assigned for the specific material 
Contamination (noun) – radioactive material where it should not be 
Downstream (adjective) – refers to the location of an object that the flow has not gone 
through yet. 
Flange (noun) – a projecting flat rim or collar on an object 
Fuel Outage (noun) – the replacement of empty fuel canisters in the core of the reactor 
every 18-24 months 
Gamma Rays (noun) – electromagnetic radiation capable of penetration, they are short in 
length than x-rays 
Gate Valve (noun) – a valve that can only be set completely closed or completely open 
Globe Valve (noun) – A valve that can be used to adjust flow 
Green House Gases (noun) – gases in the atmosphere that absorb and emit radiation 
within the thermal infrared range 
Hot Spot (noun) – an area with very high radiation dose relative to its size 
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IAS Description (noun) – the description entered manually into the IAS system for a 
given material. Because IAS descriptions are entered manually, they can vary even 
though the specific material being searched for is the same 
Isolation Valve (noun) – valve used separate flow in case of system failure 
Isometric Roadmap (noun) – a mechanical drawing containing the pipe name and pipe 
class of the pipes that comprise the system, as well as all instrumentation labels 
Kinetic Energy (noun) – energy characterized by a body in motion 
Nuclear Fission Reaction (noun) – a reaction in which a heavy nucleus splits 
spontaneously releasing energy 
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (noun) – a mechanical drawing containing the 
relevant piping and instrumentation information that compromises a system 
Piping Isometric (noun) – a 3-D mechanical drawing of an individual pipe within a 
system that includes all relevant elevations, valves, and connections to other pipes 
Precoat material (noun) – substance used with the resin in the filter demineralizer to 
remove contaminants from reactor coolant 
Radiation (noun) – Energy released in the form of radioactive waves 
Reactor Basin (noun) – Large concrete tank where various secondary processes occur 
Resin (noun) – substance used in the filter demineralizer for ion- exchange of 
contaminants 
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Spent Fuel Pool (noun)  – storage area for empty fuel canisters 
Throttle (verb) – to partially open or close a valve to limit or augment the flow rate 
Upstream (adjective) – refers to an object that the flow has gone through already 
Weldolet (noun) – a specialized type of reducer designed to connect large pipes to small 
pipes 
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Appendix C:  Scope Meeting Checklists 
Detailed Design Checklist for 50% Scope Meeting 
1. Review Design Process 
a. Modification Inlet 
i. M-247 
ii. Detail A – M-247 
iii. Piping Isometric M100BC203-7SF 
b. Modification Outlet 
i. M-231 
ii. Detail B – M-231 
iii. Piping Isometric M100B1026 
2. Alternate Injection Mode Design Specification 
a. Normal Operating Conditions in RWCU and FPC 
b. Alternate Injection Assumed Inlet Conditions 
i. Piping Specifications with Respect to Inlet Conditions 
ii. Inlet Valve Specifications 
1. Operational Secondary Isolation Valve 
2. Calve Specifications from M300 with Respect to Inlet 
Conditions 
3. Gate vs. Globe Valves 
4. Manual vs. Automated Operation 
3. Outlet Specifications 
a. Weldolet 
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Detailed Design Checklist for 90% Scope Meeting 
 
Alternate Injection Mode: Detailed Design Packed 
Meeting: 90% Review / Final MQP Presentation 
Date / Time: Wednesday, March 13, 2013 / 3:00pm 
Location: PNPS Conference Room  
Attendees: 
Name Department 
Pilgrim Personnel PNPS 
Robert Thompson WPI Faculty 
Peter Miraglia WPI Faculty 
Katherine Goldberg MCSDE Intern / WPI Student 
Scott Gallagher MCSDE Intern / WPI Student 
Nikole Stone MCSDE Intern / WPI Student 
 
Checklist: 
1. 50% Review Meeting Minutes 
a. Review minutes 
b. Previous concerns 
2. Piping Isometric Drawing 
a. M100B1026, M100BC-203-7SF and M19 
b. New piping isometric drawing explanation 
3. Materials 
a. Necessary materials for implementation 
b. Spare materials 
4. Estimate 
a. Bill of materials 
b. Man hour costs of implementation 
5. SIPD 
6. Concerns 
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50% Review Meeting Minutes 
Date / Time: Thursday, February 21, 2013 / 3:30pm 
Location: PNPS Conference Room 3F 
1. Review Design Process 
a. Modification Inlet 
i. M-247 
ii. Detail A – M-247 
iii. Piping Isometric M100BC203-7SF 
 
b. Modification Outlet 
i. M-231 
ii. Detail B – M-231 
iii. Piping Isometric M100B1026 
2. Alternate Injection Mode Design Specification 
a. Normal Operating Conditions in RWCU and FPC 
b. Alternate Injection Assumed Inlet Conditions 
i. Piping Specifications with Respect to Inlet Conditions 
ii. Inlet Valve Specifications 
1. Operational Secondary Isolation Valve 
2. Calve Specifications from M300 with Respect to Inlet 
Conditions 
3. Gate vs. Globe Valves 
 
4. Manual vs. Automated Operation 
 
3. Outlet Specifications 
a. Weldolet 
Will the modification outlet be located upstream or downstream of valve 19-HO-188? 
The inlet will be located two feet upstream of valve 19-HO-188.  This was chosen because of 
the apparent benefits of having the outlet at this location.  These benefits include the following: 
• Space availability 
• Redirection to reactor basic 
• Operation of  RWCU, FPC and RHR simultaneously 
Will a globe valve or a gate valve be used? 
 A gate valve will be used to isolate the modification. 
Will the valve be automated or manually operated? 
 The valve will be manually operated to prevent malfunctions and eliminate the need for 
backup components in cases where an automated valve should fail. 
  
